Culture as a Product (Redux): Why On Running Succeeded
The key omission from Part 1: “OPs as a startups biggest risk”
After publishing Culture as a Product last Fall, an executive coach reached out and offered a powerful insight. While A players are a startups biggest competitive edge, and C players are its biggest threat (to success/growth), I had left out a key aspect of why C players pose such a risk to a company seeking market domination: Overly Political (OP) hires. He pointed out that the Venn diagram between C-players and OPs is close to a perfect overlap (imperfect because some C players are indeed less political, but get ousted quickly due to having no buffer for incompetence; some A players as OPs but may be held into account over time — see Robert Sutton’s work) but is so risky to founders (especially CEOs) that it deserves its own paragraph (or two…), so I dedicated a new post to this idea. Indeed, OPs are not just cultural mismatches. In early-stage environments, they are existential risks.
This coach pointed me to the Wallstreet Journal bestseller, Survival of the Savvy (and shout out to Marty Seldman for an insightful exchange recently about some of the main points for startups, which I’ve adapted here) which every CEO (especially) and founder should read. I’ll say this again: Get. This. Book. As a CEO, feel free to look at the charts I’ve embedded in here, and the case study, but the CEO-specific chapter alone is worth the $14 purchase.
Exhibit A: The Organizational Savvy Continuum
The book, and accompanying research on organizational deception, makes one thing clear: politics kills momentum. Momentum is the fuel startups need to succeed.
Case Study: Susan (UP coached to be LP) and Jeannette (OP)
Note that Bill Eddy may identify Jeannette as a ‘hostile personality’ (BPD traits) due to florid gossip and manipulation and the use of negative advocates (see part 1 of Culture as a Product). The case study below is one in which the UP was ‘coached to be an LP that could identify OPs and protect herself from them.
Note: Brandon/Seldman recommend similar strategies and scripts to Bill Eddy, but the approaches are complimentary. These are some examples OP C-players may use to sabotage A players with during leadership or manager conversations:
Now how does this translate to startup success?
I’ll use the example of Nike as compared with a new player in the running shoe market: On Running. Why? Because in healthtech, we need an “On Running of Healthcare” (lets presume the conventional healthcare system is more like Nike…).
In large companies like Nike, politics can be absorbed. We can say the same about Amazon, Meta, and so forth (which I argued in the first essay — culture matters the most before market domination; then it’s a ‘nice to have’ and a competitive edge that may help the company succeed (especially as they launch new verticals) a bit more than it already is, and have better margins but is less likely to totally sink a company unless something very drastic occurs that has a major negative impact on the primary product offering).
Nike had close to 50 employees by the time it was beginning to scale in the 1970s. With robust margins and growing brand equity, even some dysfunction could be tolerated: they were building a counterculture to the dominant culture. But this was ok, as there was limited competition in the running shoe market and no real race to the top. Later, with Michael Jordan on board, they owned the market — it was a wise step to appoint a celebrity ambassador after they created a product the market simply loved.
Now let us contrast it with a startup seeking to gain market share of a pool dominated by Nike (and Adidas/Reebok). Startups don’t have the luxury of owning the market or being a first-mover. They’re first trying to prove product-market fit — they’re trying to simply exist! They need every hire to move the needle on differentiation. That’s why On Running is such an important case study in cultural and strategic discipline.
On Running didn’t launch with a flashy campaign or an influencer rollout. There was near zero hype. I heard about this obscure Swiss company from a UK friend, but didn’t consider trying on shoes until another friend, working in the Emergency Room in New York in early 2020, mentioned that half of the ER docs wore them due to the long hours in those early months of the pandemic. The shoes provided support and their feet were less sore after sometimes 12–24 hour intense shifts. So: I bought a pair of “ONs” and loved them. I’ve purchased five pairs since, and I haven’t bought a pair of Nike running shoes since 2019: it’s a sticky product and everyone I know who owns a pair evangelizes them. Is there marketing? Sure, but it's icing on top of organic hype due to an excellent shoe. :)
On Running eventually brought Roger Federer on board, but only after the product was exceptional enough to warrant his interest. Their early team was tiny — just three co-founders and a handful of high-performing individuals in the first few years. Who were they?
1.Oliver Bernhard: former Swiss triathlete (who won the Ironman many times)who had the lived experience of ‘wanting a better shoe’. He wasn’t (and isn’t) a household name, so was never in the running (see what I did there ;) ) to be a brand ambassador, but perfect as a founder
2.David Alleman: brand strategy pro
3.Caspar Coppetti: seasoned operator (GTM)
Wait but who was the industrial designer/engineer? Oliver Bernhard! Crucially, when he retired from elite sports, he dabbled in prototypes (e.g. taking pieces of a garden hose glued to a shoe to simulate CloudTec). A ‘tech’ cofounder (or engineer) wasn’t needed: what was needed was someone who could identify the best possible early tech hire (engineer/industrial designer) to create what Bernhard wanted. That first eng hire had to convince Bernhard (and he did).
On Running was obsessed. So they worked obsessively, with engineers/designers, in stealth for years. They weren’t trying to be 5% better than Nike. They were aiming to be 10x to 100x better. That required being heads-down and focused on building breakthrough technology (CloudTec), cutting-edge design, and elite performance testing. It required execution without politics: any friction was secondary to debate about building a better product, not sabotaging team or manager efforts. As well, Alleman and Coppetti were building the roadmap for growth and operations for deployment only *after* they had a product they could stand behind, one that was sticky and where users were starting to tell their friends to buy a pair of the shoes (and that’s when Federer came on board).
With those early hires on the design and tech side, while still in stealth and for that first year to 18 months out of stealth, they didn’t hire for politics. They hired for excellence — the best possible shoe designers, marketers, engineers, customer service reps (see also: Zappos’ strategy), and so forth that they could afford. Intentional A player hires helped On Running build [the product] slow so they could then go [scale] fast. That’s the hidden genius of On Running’s early years. They delayed growth until the foundation was unshakable. And when they did scale, they did so with trust and competence, on the shoulders of an exceptional team, as their compass.
Federer became a co-founder to amplify what was already excellent, not to be a hypeman for a lackluster product. The core principle was clear: build something exceptional first. Everything else follows. Their IPO in 2021 was one I paid attention to, as an On Running customer, and they’ve grown exponentially since (they ‘crossed the chasm’). Next time you’re at a gym take a look at how many are wearing On Running. Next time you’re simply walking around doing errands, look down. It’s Malcolm Gladwell’s Hush Puppies theory, but modernized for 2025.
The major block to becoming the On Running of [X] industry, is what many startups get wrong: they overindex on Overly Political (OP) individuals (sometimes friends or those who pose less of an ego threat) who are almost never A-players (they’re often low B or C players) who keep their roles through manipulation, not merit. They withhold information, create drama, manage up, and sabotage [usually A-player] peers — all while appearing as agreeable takers (see Adam Grant’s work). They prioritize self-promotion over the success of the company (see the OP and LP continuum in Exhibit A above). The startup ecosystem, which moves fast and relies on trust, is especially vulnerable to these tactics.
The book highlights how OP individuals exploit a critical leadership blind spot. According to Seldman and Brandon, OPs:
- Master words and buzzwords, creating a perception of intelligence.
- Manage impressions, ensuring they look good to those in power.
- Claim credit for wins, and plant seeds of blame in advance of losses.
- Track power dynamics closely, aligning with rising stars and avoiding risk.
- Sabotage quietly, using “calculated attacks” that sow doubt about others (this is the gossip, manipulation, and underhanded tactics described in “Culture as a Product” and which Billy Eddy expands upon in his work.
CEOs, in particular, are often targets of deception, so much so that an entire chapter is dedicated to assisting CEOs avoid this deception. In Chapter 18: Expect Deception, Even (Especially) as a CEO outlines, people in power become vulnerable due to self-deception and a desire to be seen in a positive light. Over time, they become isolated — surrounded by people who tell them what they want to hear. Their access to accurate information narrows. Their feedback loops degrade. And that creates a wide-open door for OP players to take hold: for a startup this impacts the competitive moat in two ways. The first is an inability to execute (product standards fall because A players leave or are silenced/not supported). The second is a delay shipping product (for the same reason).
These two things can sink a startup quickly because the first leads to a less sticky (and less exceptional) product. The second leads to an advantage for a competitor who can ship faster to the same target market. No amount of marketing can solve either of these issues — even an A player-filled marketing team (=marketing burn & high CAC) cannot fix churn due to issues in the foundation (product, product, product). Great products lead to high customer retention and network effects. This wins, each time, as On Running clearly shows.
Indeed, this condition, which the authors in jest term “CEO Disease,” can lead to poor decision-making, erosion of culture, and the loss of top talent. Founders often don’t see the full impact until it’s too late — when the best people have left, deadlines have slipped, and the culture has turned sour.
That’s why On Running’s slow, deliberate hiring strategy worked. They protected their core. They didn’t just build a good culture — they defended it. They knew that even one low-trust hire in a 10-person team could sabotage the entire operation. So they prioritized high trust and high competence, staying firmly in the top-right of the Trust/Competence Grid (see below).
Compare that to the early Nike culture — which was innovative, but also more tolerant of internal competition, friction, and ambiguity. While Nike ultimately succeeded (thanks to an incredible brand and product-market fit), their path was messier. Arguably, if Nike were created today, using the same approach, it may not pass the seed or Series A round. Timing does, indeed matter, and competition in most industries in the 1960s/70s today is nothing like it is today (and it will only continue to become more intense).
On Running, by contrast, grew with precision. It’s no surprise they reached a multi-billion dollar valuation within a decade, with global traction and an iconic athlete-turned-co-founder-turned face of the company in Roger Federer.
Alright, so using the case of On Running, and the wisdom in Survival of the Savvy, what’s the lesson for startups who need to build an exceptional product that scales, with the agility to move quickly with little to no internal blockers (there are enough external blockers, namely time and competition)?
- Avoid OP hires at all costs (or quickly dehire if identified). They don’t just slow you down — they destroy trust, sabotage A-players, and create blind spots for leadership. Review and understand the scripts and approaches in the book (i.e. the language OPs typically use) and respond using Bill Eddy’s BIFF method to refocus the conversation towards the product and company priorities.
- Expect deception as a CEO. Especially as your company grows, you will be flattered, misled, and manipulated, because you have power. Build systems to spot this early so incompetence doesn’t beget incompetence (or completely derail a team or the entire company).
- Prioritize trust and competence. The Trust/Competence Grid makes it clear: high-trust, high-competence people are your core team. Protect them.
- Don’t mistake performance theater for execution. Ask the hard questions. Ask for data/evidence (especially when faced with an OP ‘saboteur’). Reward substance over hype or distraction: startups can’t afford internal blockers (it places them at a disadvantage vs competitors who have engaged thoughtfully in culture and hiring).
- Train under political (UP)) A-players to become LPs that are mindful of OPs. This was the toughest lesson, I’m grateful that Seldman doubled down on this during our discussion recently, and it’s echoed explicitly in his book. Most A player UPs want the work to speak for itself, but it never will. They believe that competence will drown out the noise OPs often make. But building alliances and being wise to OP behavior (‘transforming into an LP’) allows that work to be executed effectively to move the company and metrics forward. Coaching UPs in this specific area is a worthwhile investment for the startup. The case study above, with Susan and Jeannette is especially helpful (Susan was a workshop client of Seldman and Brandon).
- When in doubt, be lean. With the capabilities of AI now, lean teams (comprised of competent, engaged members) are as, if not more, positioned to be unicorns. A lean team of A player UP or LPs (with integrity, ethics), is more positioned for the long game and market domination over a clunky large team that leans towards OP, suffers from a lack of PMF and execution and gets overshadowed by a more agile competitor.
Startups live and die by their people. On Running thrived because they stayed focused on what mattered — product, execution, and culture. They didn’t scale prematurely, they didn’t hire for politics, and they didn’t fall for theater. They built something exceptional — and they did it without the organizational drag of internal sabotage. They’ve scaled to a $14.97B market cap (even with limited marketing and limited Instagram presence — the latter which I sort of wish they had earlier :) ). Oh and Federer? His decision to be a cofounder and brand ambassador of this once obscure running shoe brand has made him 3x more money than tennis sponsorships or prizes did, and that trend is upwards.
Every tech founder should take note of ONs (as a case study) and OPs (as a risk). Because hype fades while culture compounds; the latter is key to crossing the chasm towards growth and market domination.
